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1 Introduction
Which environmental policy instrument gives the highest incentives to develop and adopt
cleaner technologies? Which environmental policy instrument is best able to deal with
asymmetric information about abatement costs of newly introduced production tech-
niques? Should environmental policy be set before the rms have chosen their abatement
technology (commitment) or afterward (time consistency)? These are among the most
crucial and widely analyzed issues in environmental policy. To the best of our knowledge,
however, so far only DAmato and Dijkstra (2015) have addressed all three questions to-
gether, and only under the assumption of non-strategic rms. In this paper, we extend
the analysis to strategic rm behaviour.
We model the technology adoption choice by a single polluting rm which is subject
to regulation through price-based or quantity-based controls. Environmental regulation
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of a single rm, with increasing marginal damage of pollution, may seem unrealistic. One
could think of a large polluter by a small lake, or on a small island. More importantly, this
is the simplest setup that allows us to study a strategic regulatory environment, where
one rms decisions make a large di¤erence to the aggregate outcome. This is the polar
opposite of DAmato and Dijkstras (2015) multi-rm industry. Regulation of an industry
with several large rms, the more realistic case that falls in between the two extremes, can
be studied next. We will assume increasing marginal damage to allow for a non-trivial
comparison between taxation and emission quotas. If marginal damage were constant,
the regulator would always be able to implement the rst best with taxation (under
commitment and time consistency) by setting the tax rate equal to marginal damage.
We nd that with emission quotas, except for very specic xed costs ranges, com-
mitment leads to higher welfare than time consistency, as the former generates larger
incentives to invest than the latter. Indeed, time consistency under emission quotas ef-
fectively punishes investment, because it results in a lower quota. Surprisingly, under
time consistency the regulator does not gain much from the information learnt from the
rms investment decision. Conclusions are reversed when dealing with emission taxes:
time consistency is shown to yield higher welfare in most of the xed costs ranges un-
der scrutiny; this can be explained accountig for the larger incentives to invest taxation
provides. Finally, we also compare quotas and taxes for quadratic abatement cost and
damage functions. Concerning commitment, we nd that quotas yield, in most of the
scenarios concerning xed costs, higher welfare than taxes. However, we cannot rank the
instruments for the time consistency scenario.
Our analysis is linked to several strands of the literature. Since Downing and White
(1986) and Milliman and Prince (1989), an attempt has been made to compare the relative
merits of di¤erent environmental policy instruments in terms of their incentives for R&D
into and adoption of new abatement technologies. This literature has been surveyed by
Ja¤e et al. (2003) and Requate (2005a).
Weitzman (1974) was the rst to systematically address the relative performance of
price and quantity regulation under uncertainty in environmental policy or indeed any
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area of policy.2
Moledina et al. (2003) compare taxes and tradable permits with grandfathering in a
two-rm industry. The regulator does not know the rmsabatement cost and does not
take into account that the rms will try to manipulate her beliefs and policy. The authors
show that rms will underabate under taxation in order to obtain a lower tax rate. The
result for tradable permits is less clearcut. On one hand, both rms benet from a high
permit price, because this will prompt the regulator to issue more permits. On the other
hand, the permit buyer (seller) prefers a low (high) permit price.
The literature on the timing of government policy, starting with Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Fischer (1980), has almost unanimously found that with perfect information,
commitment is always at least as good as time consistency. This result has been challenged
by several papers on environmental policy (Amacher and Malik, 2002; Arguedas and
Hamoudi, 2004; Requate, 2005b; Moner-Colonques and Rubio, 2015).
Let us now consider papers that combine at least two of the three issues just reviewed.
Combining innovation and policy timing, Requate and Unold (2001, 2003) study the
case where the regulator sets the emission tax rate or the number of tradable emission
permits either before (commitment) or after (time consistency) the many small rms in
the industry have chosen between the conventional and a new abatement technology. Both
instruments yield the rst best in both scenarios when rms are heterogeneous (Requate
and Unold, 2001), but commitment to a tax rate does not always yield the rst best when
rms are homogeneous (Requate and Unold, 2003).
Amacher and Malik (2002) also compare commitment and time consistency, but only
for emission taxation of a single rm choosing its abatement technology. They show that
welfare may be higher with time consistency. Amacher and Malik (2001) show that unlike
emission taxation, an emission quota always implements the rst best with commitment.
Our paper builds on Amacher and Malik (2002) to include asymmetric information. We
nd that with taxation, time consistency usually yields higher welfare. Due to asymmetric
2Recent papers in this vein include Coria and Hennlock (2012), who focus on policy reactions to tech-
nological development in the presence of transaction and political costs and Ambec and Coria (2013) who
analyze the control of two pollutants with asymmetric information about their interdependent abatement
costs. Goodkind and Coggins (2015) take corner solutions into account. In a two-country model, Weitzel
(2017) analyses how an abatement cost shock in one country a¤ects both countries.
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information, commitment does not implement the rst best with an emission quota, and
time consistency can yield higher welfare in this case as well.
Combining asymmetric information and innovation, Mendelsohn (1984), Krysiak (2008)
and Storrøsten (2014) examine the choice between price and quantity instruments under
commitment. In all three papers, technology choice is continuous: A rm can invest to re-
duce the intercept and (in Krysiak (2008) and Storrøsten (2014)) the slope of its Marginal
Abatement Cost (MAC) curve. Mendelsohn (1984) considers a single rm, with asym-
metric information about marginal abatement costs and investment costs. Krysiak (2008)
models an industry with many ex-ante identical small rms who discover their marginal
abatement costs after their investment decision. Storrøsten (2014) adds product demand
uncertainty to this. All three papers nd that endogenous technical change reduces the
slope of the long-run MAC curve, making quantity regulation more attractive. In our
paper, with linearMAC and marginal environmental damage functions, we also nd that
quotas are generally better than taxes under commitment. This is because quotas o¤er
higher investment incentives, and the MAC curve is relatively at.
Yao (1988) assumes that asymmetric information concerns the rmsinnovation ca-
pacity. The game consists of two periods and involves a single player (the "industry"). In
period one, the regulator sets the period-one emission standard. Then industry chooses
a research investment level. The game is repeated in period two. Yao (1988) nds that
the industry underinvests in period 1 in an attempt to reduce the regulators condence
in its ability and to obtain a more lenient standard in period 2. The regulator partially
counteracts this e¤ect by setting a stricter standard in period 1.
Finally, we shall discuss three papers that combine all three elements of innovation,
uncertainty and policy timing. Malik (1991) compares commitment and time consistency
for quota setting for a single rm in a two-period model where the period-2 damage
function is revealed in period 2. The advantage of time consistency is that the regulator
has perfect information when she sets the quotas. The disadvantage is that the rm
underinvests in abatement capital in period 1 to obtain a more lenient period-2 quota.
Tarui and Polasky (2005) study a simplied version of Maliks (1991) game with only
a single period and without costly enforcement. However, they analyze taxes as well as
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quotas. Commitment would result in the rst best if there were no uncertainty about
damages, because the rm has a continuous investment decision. With time consistency,
the result is again that the rm underinvests with quotas and overinvests with taxes.
When abatement costs and damages are quadratic, taxes are welfare-superior to quotas.
DAmato and Dijkstra (2015) introduce asymmetric information into the Requate and
Unold (2001, 2003) model discussed above: Firms di¤er in their xed costs of adopting the
new abatement technology, but all rms in the industry either have high or low variable
cost of using the new technology. The cost realization is revealed to the rms, but not
to the regulator. Time consistency allows the regulator to infer the cost realization both
with emission taxation and with tradable permits, and to implement the rst best, as
with complete information (Requate and Unold, 2001). However, unlike with complete
information, the regulator cannot implement the rst best with commitment. In this case,
the welfare comparison follows a modied Weitzman (1974) rule: Tradable permits lead
to higher welfare than emission taxation if the weighted slope of theMAC curve is atter
than the Marginal Environmental Damage curve. Intriguingly, the slope of the high-cost
MAC is weighted with the probability that the costs are low, and vice versa.
We apply DAmato and Dijkstras (2015) model to the regulation of a single rm. The
game structure in our paper is also close to Tarui and Polasky (2005), but uncertainty
enters in the form of asymmetric information on abatement costs, as in Moledina et al.
(2003). Unlike Moledina et al. (2003), we assume the regulator realizes that the rm may
try to manipulate her beliefs and policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 shows the main structure of
the model. In Section 3 we compare commitment and time consistency with quotas. In
Section 4 we do the same for emission taxation. In Section 5 we compare quotas and
emission taxation. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We model the behaviour of a single polluting rm, currently using abatement technology
1 with no xed cost and variable cost C(a); where a is the abatement level. The rm must
choose whether or not to invest in a cleaner technology. The new technology has lower
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marginal abatement costs,3 but involves xed investment costs (F > 0). The variable
cost of the new technology is C(a); where  is the rms type, that can take two values:
 high ( = h); implying that the rm is ine¢ cient in using the new technology,
 low ( = l); implying that the rm is e¢ cient in using the new technology.
Parameter  is known by the regulated rm, while the regulator only knows its a
priori distribution, according to which  = h with probability p 2 (0; 1) and  = l with
probability 1  p. By denition, l < h < 1; implying that for both types of rm, the new
technology has lower variable and marginal cost than the existing technology:We can say
that there are three technologies  ( = l; h; 1) and the rm of type  (or rm  for short)
can choose between technologies 1 and ;  = l; h:
The cost function satises C 0(0) = 0; C 0(a) > 0 for a > 0; and C 00(a) > 0: An example
is given in Figure 1 with marginal abatement costs MAC1 for the current technology and
MACl (MACh) for the new technology with low (high) cost.4
Environmental damage from pollution is increasing and convex in emissions and there-
fore decreasing and convex in abatement. Damages are given by D(e   a); where e are
(exogenous) unabated emissions, with D0 = 0 for e   a = 0; D0 > 0 for e   a > 0; and
D00 > 0. MED in Figure 1 is an example of a marginal environmental damage curve:
The objective of the environmental regulator is to minimize social costs. We assume
that for all policy equilibria we consider, there is a unique interior cost minimum, and the
second order conditions hold globally.
(Variable) Social Costs (V )SC for technology  ( = l; h; 1) are:
SC(a) = F + V SC(a) = F + C(a) +D(e  a) (1)
with F1 = 0 and F = F > 0 for  = h; l: The socially optimal abatement level a is
implicitly dened by the rst order condition:
C 0(a) = D
0(e  a) (2)
3We abstract from the possibility that technological change increasesMAC for high levels of abatement
(Amir et al. (2008), Bauman et al. (2008), Bréchet and Jouvet (2008), Perino and Requate (2012)).
4All gures in this paper assume that marginal abatement costs and marginal environmental damage
are linear in abatement. However, our formal analysis is not limited to this case. The MAC and MED
curves in the gures are drawn for illustrative purposes and do not always satisfy all conditions we impose
on them in the paper.
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Figure 1: Abatement targets
In Figure 1, social costs under technology 1, h and l are given by the areasOBe; OHe+
F and OLe+ F respectively: Totally di¤erentiating (2) with respect to ; we nd:
da
d
=
 C 0(a)
C 00(a) +D00(e  a)
< 0 (3)
Thus, as we see in Figure 1:
a1 < a

h < a

l (4)
We dene F  ( = h; l) as the level of xed costs that equates social costs for the exist-
ing and the new technology at the optimal abatement levels a1 for the existing technology
and a ( = h; l) for new technology . From (1):
F   C(a1) +D(e  a1)  C(a) D(e  a) (5)
Totally di¤erentiating with respect to  and applying (2) yields:
dF 
d
=  C(a) < 0 (6)
Since F h = 0 in (5) for h ! 1 and l < h < 1; this implies F l > F h > 0: In Figure 1,
F h is given by the area OBH and F

l by OBL:
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Following Amacher and Malik (2002, p. 897), we will limit the number of cases to be
examined by assuming that adoption of the new technology is socially desirable, in the
sense that the minimized social costs are lower with the new technology, even if its cost
are high. Thus we assume SCh(ah) < SC1(a

1) or equivalently F < F

h :
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In Figure 1, suppose the linear MAC1 is very steep. Then when  is very low, the
marginal abatement cost curve is almost horizontal and total abatement costs at the social
optimum a are very low. When  rises, total abatement costs at a

 also rise, until they
reach a maximum at a = e=2:When  rises above e=2; abatement costs start to decrease.
When  = 1, the marginal abatement cost curve is almost vertical and total abatement
costs at a tend to zero again. Thus with quadratic abatement cost and environmental
damage functions, abatement costs at the social optimum a are an inverse U-shaped
function of :6 This result holds for a large variety of other functional forms. In fact, we
shall only consider functional forms for which it holds:
Assumption 1. The function C(a); with 0 <  < 1 and a

 dened by (2), is unimodal
with the maximum denoted by  = ~:
In the course of our analysis we shall make a number of additional assumptions in-
tended to maximize the number of equilibria that can occur and to facilitate the pre-
sentation.7 We prefer to introduce these assumptions when we have dened the relevant
variables.
We analyze two environmental policy instruments in two policy regimes. The two en-
vironmental policy instruments are emission taxation and emission quotas. The emission
quota species the maximum allowed level of emissions. Since emissions are given by
5Thus in our setting investment can never be larger than the socially optimal level. The issue of
overinvestment is addressed in several papers, including Requate and Unold (2001, 2003) and Tarui and
Polasky (2005).
6This can be seen as follows. Let C(a) = 12a
2 and D(e   a) = d2 (e   a)2; making MAC and MED
linear in e. By (2), a solves a = d(e  a); so that a = de=(+ d) and
C(a) =

2

de
+ d
2
Maximizing this with respect to  yields  = d and thus a = e=2:
7These are Fhl > 0 in (15), F
l
l < F

h and Fl < F

h in (5), (15) and (34), and Assumptions 2 and 3 in
Appendix B.
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the di¤erence between exogenous business-as-usual emissions and abatement, the emis-
sion quota translates straightforwardly into an abatement target. We shall use the terms
"(emission) quota" and "(abatement) target" interchangeably. The two policy regimes
we consider are commitment and time consistency, the di¤erence between them occurring
in stages one and two of the game between the regulator and the rm.
In stage zero of each game, nature draws the rms type : The type is revealed to the
rm, but not to the regulator. All other parameters are common knowledge.
Under commitment, the regulator sets the abatement target or the emission tax rate
in stage one. In stage two, the rm chooses a technology. This order is reversed under
time consistency.
Finally, in stage three the rm chooses its abatement level. With abatement targets,
it simply complies with the target.
For these sequential games with incomplete information, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE) is the standard equilibrium concept (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), section 8.2;
Tadelis (2013), Ch. 15). A PBE requires that each player is sequentially rational, i.e. at
a given information set she takes the expected utility maximizing choice given her system
of beliefs. A system of beliefs assigns a probability to each state of the world in each
information set. In our game, it species the probability that the regulator assigns to
the rm being of type h; given its investment decision. Beliefs have to be consistent, i.e.
formed according to Bayesrule. Under commitment, where the regulator cannot learn
anything from the rms investment behaviour, the PBE reduces to the Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). For the sake of brevity, and where not needed to explain
results, we will refer to the relevant equilibrium concept simply as "equilibrium".
Anticipating our analysis in the following sections, it is easily seen that (unlike in the
Amacher and Malik (2001, 2002) models with perfect information) the regulator cannot
achieve the rst best under any of these scenarios. Given that F < F h , the rst best is
for each type of rm to invest and for type  to abate a given by (2). It is clear from
Figure 1 that rm l has lower marginal environmental damage in this case and should be
set a stricter target or a lower tax rate.8 Under commitment however, the regulator has
8This is formalized by equations (3) and (27) respectively.
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to set the same target or tax rate for both types. When both types invest under time
consistency, the regulator cannot infer whether the rm is of type h or l and will again
have to set the same policy for both.
We can also establish:9
Lemma 1 The regulator would be able to achieve the rst best under commitment as well
as time consistency, if she could verify the rms choice between the current and the new
technology, and o¤er the rm a contract. This contract would specify a payment T from
the rm to the regulator depending on the rms choice of abatement and (if necessary)
technology.
Though theoretically feasible, the rst best contract implies the regulator can perfectly
verify technology choice by the rm and make lump sum transfers. In order to focus on
realistic contracts, we shall assume in the following that the regulator cannot o¤er the
rm such a contract, either because the rms technology choice cannot be veried, or
because of constraints on the type of instrument that the regulator is allowed to use.
3 Emission quotas
In this section we establish the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria for emission quotas under
commitment (subsection 3.1) and time consistency (subsection 3.2), and compare the two
policy regimes to each other (subsection 3.3). The emission quota species the maximum
allowed level of emissions. Alternatively, we can say that the regulator sets an abatement
target specifying the minimum required level a of abatement.
3.1 Commitment
Under commitment, the regulator sets the emission quota in stage one before the rm
chooses whether to invest or not in stage two.
Starting the analysis in stage two, given that the regulator has set the abatement
target at a and the rm is of type ; the rm invests if and only if F < F(a) where:
F(a)  (1  )C(a) (7)
9The proofs of all lemmas and of Propositions 4 and 6 are in Appendix A.
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Since h > l we have Fh(a) < Fl(a): Also note that dF(a)=da > 0 since C 0 > 0:
In stage one, the regulator can set the quota such that F < Fh(a) and both types of
rm invest, Fh(a) < F < Fl(a) and only rm l invests, or F > Fl(a) and the rm does
not invest. Let us examine which quota the regulator would like to set in each of these
scenarios.
If the regulator sets a such that F < Fh(a); both types of rm will invest. If both
types of rm are going to invest, the regulator would like to set the quota that mimimizes:
E [SChl(a)] = F +D(e  a) +mC(a) (8)
where
m  E() = ph+ (1  p) l (9)
The optimal target am is then implicitly dened by the rst order condition:
mC 0(am) = D
0(e  am) (10)
It follows from (3) and h > m > l that:
ah < a

m < a

l (11)
In Figure 1, the curve MACm represents the LHS of rst order condition (10) and
E [SChl(a

m)] is given by the area OMe:
We nd that:
Lemma 2 Both types of rm will invest when the regulator has set am:
Figure 1 illustrates this lemma, which is equivalent to F < Fh(am) as given by (7) and
(10). In Figure 1, Fh(am) is area OWJ; which exceeds the maximum value of F given by
F h = OBH:
If the regulator sets a such that Fh(a) < F < Fl(a); only rm l will invest. If the rm
is only going to invest when it is of type l, the regulator would like to set the quota that
minimizes:
E [SC1l(a)] = pSC1(a) + (1  p)SCl(a) (12)
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The optimal target a1l in this case is implicitly dened by the rst order condition:
[p+ (1  p)l]C 0(a1l) = D0(e  a1l) (13)
The following lemma shows that the regulator prefers am with investment by both
types to a1l with investment by rm l only:
Lemma 3 E [SChl(am)] < E [SC1l(a1l)], with E[SChl(a)] given by (8), a

m by (10), E[SC1l(a)]
by (12) and a1l by (13):
The result follows from the assumption that investment is socially desirable for any
rms type.
Finally, if the regulator sets a such that F > Fl(a); the rm will not invest. If the rm
is not going to invest, the regulator would like to set a1 as dened in (2). We shall now
see that the regulator prefers am with investment by both types to a

1 without investment,
which requires F < F m as dened by (5) and (9). It follows from (6) and m < h that
F m > F

h : Since we have assumed that F < F

h ; we also have F < F

m: In Figure 1, F

m is
given by the area OBM: Since F is assumed to be smaller than OBH; it is also smaller
than OBM:
Thus we can conclude:
Proposition 1 Let the regulator set the abatement target a in stage one and let the rm
make its investment decision in stage two. In the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, in
stage one the regulator sets am; given by (10), and in stage two the rm invests, irrespective
of its type.
3.2 Time consistency
With time consistency, the rm decides in stage one whether or not to invest and the
regulator sets the quota in stage two. If the rm does not invest in stage one, the
regulator will set the abatement target at a1 given by (2) in stage two. In this case the
rms type is irrelevant and we do not need to specify the regulators beliefs. However,
we do need to specify the regulators beliefs about the rms type if it has invested.
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Let us denote by q the regulators posterior probability that the rm is of type h given
that it has invested in stage one: There are three possible equilibrium values for q which
we shall discuss in the following three subsections. Subsection 3.2.4 concludes with a
statement of all equilibria in this scenario.
3.2.1 Firm h invests
In the rst case, the regulator believes that both types of rm would have invested. Thus
she does not learn anything when the rm has invested: her posterior probability q that
the rm is of type h is the same as the prior probability p: In this case, the regulator sets
the abatement target at am given by (10) in stage two.
In stage one, if rm  anticipates that the regulator will set am in (10) when it invests,
it will invest for:
F < F m  C(a1)  C (am) (14)
with a1 given by (2). Since h > l, F
h
m < F
l
m: In Figure 1, F
h
m is given by OBa

1 OJam =
OBG a1GJam and F lm by OBa1 OKam = OBS a1SKam:When F < F hm; both rm
types invest, conrming the regulators beliefs.
3.2.2 Firm h does not invest
In the second case, the regulator believes that only rm l would have invested. Now the
regulator learns the rm type when she sees that the rm has invested: her posterior
probability q that the rm is of type h equals zero. In this case, the regulator sets the
abatement target at al dened by (2) in stage two.
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In stage one, if rm  anticipates that the regulator will set al in (2) when it invests,
it will invest for:
F < F l  C (a1)  C(al ) (15)
As with F m, F
h
l < F
l
l : In Figure 1, F
h
l is given by OBa

1 OY al = OBG a1GY al and
F ll by OBa

1 OLal = OBS   a1SLal : When F hl < F; type h will not invest, conrming
the regulators beliefs. When F hl < F < F
l
l ; only type l will invest. When F
l
l < F; type l
will not invest either. We shall assume F ll < F

h in order to include the latter equilibrium.
10We will assume that if the regulator believes neither type of rm would have invested, she would set
al in the out-of-equilibrium event that the rm did invest.
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3.2.3 Firm h mixes
There is a third possible case, where the regulator believes that rm l would always have
invested and rm h would have invested with probability  2 (0; 1): Upon investment,
the regulator updates the probability that the rm is of type h to q according to Bayes
rule (e.g. Tadelis (2013), section 19.4.3):
q = Pr (hjinvestment) = Pr(investmentjh) Pr(h)
Pr(investment)
=
p
p + 1  p
In stage two, the regulator sets the quota to minimize expected variable social cost
given by:
E [V SCl(a)] =
p
p + 1  phC(a) +
1  p
p + 1  plC(a) +D(e  a) (16)
The rst (second) term is the abatement cost of rm h (l)multiplied by the probability
that the investing rm is a rm of type h (l): The optimal target ar in this case is implicitly
dened by the rst order condition:
rC 0(ar) = D
0(e  ar); r 
ph+ (1  p)l
p + 1  p (17)
We see that r 2 (l;m) is increasing in  2 (0; 1); with m dened by (9): It then follows
from (3) that ar is decreasing in  and:
al > a

r > a

m (18)
because l < r < m:11
In stage one, if rm h expects the regulator to set ar in (17); it will be indi¤erent
between investing and not investing if:
F = Fr  C(a1)  hC(ar) (19)
As C 0 > 0; Fr is decreasing in ar: It then follows from (18) that rm h can be made
indi¤erent between investing and not investing, conrming the regulators beliefs, for
F 2 F hl ; F hm : Here F hl is given by (15) and F hm by (14), with F hl < F hm by (18) and
C 0 > 0: In Figure 1, Fmh = OBS   a1SKam exceeds F hl = OBS   a1SLal by amKLal .
We can show that:
11There is no interval of F for which there is a mixed strategy PBE with rm l randomizing and rm
h not investing. In this case, the regulator would set al given by (2) after investment. Firm l would only
be indi¤erent between investing and not investing for F = F ll given by (15).
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Lemma 4 F hm < F
l
l ; with F
h
m given by (14) and F
l
l by (15):
We shall assume F hl > 0: Combined with Lemma 4 and our assumption that F
l
l < F

h ,
this assures that we include all equilibria where rm h invests with probability  2 (0; 1).
3.2.4 Equilibria
We know from the analysis above that the critical F values are F hm; F
h
l and F
l
l dened
by (14) and (15): We have seen at the end of the previous subsection that F hl < F
h
m: The
equilibria, illustrated in Figure 2, are then as follows:
Proposition 2 Let the rm decide in stage one whether or not to invest and let the
regulator set the abatement target a in stage two. Let F hl > 0 and F
l
l < F

h with F
h
l ; F
l
l
given by (15) and F h by (5). Then the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium outcomes are:
1. When F < F hl ; with F
h
l given by (15), both types of rm invest and the regulator
sets am given by (10):
2. When F hl < F < F
h
m; with F
h
m given by (14), there are three equilibria. In the
rst equilibrium, both types of rm invest and the regulator sets am: In the second
equilibrium, only rm l invests and the regulator sets al ; given by (2), if the rm has
invested. Finally, in the mixed strategy equilibrium, rm h invests with probability
 while rm l always invests. If the rm has invested, the regulator sets ar: The
values of  and ar as functions of F follow from (17) and (19):
3. When F hm < F < F
l
l ; only rm l invests and the regulator sets a

l if the rm has
invested.
4. When F > F ll ; the rm does not invest:
In each equilibrium, if the rm does not invest, the regulator sets a1, given by (2):
We see that with emission quotas under time consistency, there are multiple equilibria,
depending on xed costs F . There is even a range of F where three equilibria overlap
(Proposition 2.2). The rm prefers the equilibrium with the most lenient target, i.e.
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Figure 2: Abatement targets, time consistency: Equilibrium targets for the investing rm
and investment decisions.
where both types invest and the regulator sets am.
12 One may wonder why the rm, as
the rst mover, does not choose to play this equilibrium. The reason is that in a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium, the rm plays its best response to the regulators system of beliefs,
where the system of beliefs has to be consistent with the rms behaviour. The rm does
not get to choose the regulators system of beliefs, only whether or not to invest.
3.3 Comparing commitment and time consistency
We can now compare the equilibrium outcomes under commitment and time consistency
(Propositions 1 and 2 respectively) with respect to investment and expected social costs.
We see that under commitment, the regulator always sets am and both types of rm
invest. With time consistency, this is only one of the four possible equilibria. In a way,
investment is punished under time consistency, because it results in stricter targets.
Let us now consider welfare. For F hl < F < F
h
m; there is a mixed strategy equilibrium
under time consistency where rm l always invests and rm h invests with probability :
12We shall see in subsection 4.3 that the regulator prefers the equilibrium where only rm l invests.
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Expected social cost is:
E(SC) = p(1  )SC1(a1) + [1  p(1  )]E [V SCl(ar) + F ]
= p(1  ) [C(a1) +D(e  a1)] +
+ [(1  p)l + ph]C(ar) + [1  p+ p] [D(e  ar) + F ]
= C(a1)  (1  p)[h  l]C(ar) + p(1  )D(e  a1) + [1  p(1  )]D(e  ar) (20)
The second equality follows from (1) and (16). The third equality follows from (19).
Let us determine what happens to expected social cost as F rises from F hl to F
h
m: This
means we are moving from point X to point W in Figure 2, with  rising from 0 to 1
while ar falls from a

l to a

m according to dE(SC)=da

r = 0 in (17). Then, from the nal
line in (20):
dE(SC)
d
=
@E(SC)
@
= p [D(e  ar) D(e  a1)] < 0 (21)
The inequality follows from ar > a

1 (by (4) and (18)) and D
0 > 0: Thus, expected
social costs in the mixed strategy equilibrium are decreasing in  and (paradoxically) in
F , and increasing in ar:
We can now compare expected social costs in the three time consistency equilibria
(one of which is also the commitment equilibrium) in the interval F 2 F hl ; F hm : Starting
at F hl with the commitment and time consistency equilibrium where both types invest
(point V in Figure 2), expected social costs rise at the rate of F as we increase F towards
point W: At W we change to the mixed strategy equilbrium. By (21), expected social
costs rise as we move up, with  decreasing from 1 to 0 and F decreasing, from W to
X: At X we switch to the equilibrium where only rm l invests. Increasing F from point
X to Y raises expected social costs at the rate of (1   p)F: Thus expected social costs
rise continually along the trajectory VWXY: It then follows that for given F; expected
social costs are lowest in the commitment equilibrium and highest in the time consistency
equilibrium where only rm l invests, with the mixed strategy equilibrium in between.
For F 2 F hm; F ll , the welfare comparison between commitment and time consistency
is ambiguous. When F > F ll ; the rm does not invest and abates a

1 in the time consistency
equilibrium. As we have seen in subsection 3.1, welfare in this equilibrium is lower than
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in the commitment outcome with both types of rm investing and abating am. We can
conclude:
Proposition 3 Comparing the commitment and time consistency equilibria under emis-
sion quotas:
1. Investment by both types of rm always happens in the commitment equilibrium.
With time consistency, it occurs in the unique equilibrium for F < F hl and in one
of three equilibria for F hl < F < F
h
m: In such cases timing does not a¤ect welfare.
2. For F hm < F < F
l
l , there is a unique time-consistent equilibrium where rm h does
not invest and gets a target of a1; while rm l invests and gets a target of a

l : In this
equilibrium, expected social cost may be lower than with commitment.
3. For all other F values, expected social cost is higher in the time-consistent equilibria
that are di¤erent from the commitment equilibrium.
We see that with emission quotas, in all cases where we can unambiguously sign the
welfare di¤erence, commitment leads to higher welfare than time consistency (Proposition
3.3). This is because the investment incentive is higher under commitment. As we have
seen, investment is punished under time consistency, because it results in stricter quotas.
The fact that in the time consistency scenario, the rms investment decision may reveal
something about its type is not very helpful in this setup. In some equilibria, the rm
reveals that it is of type h by not investing. However, the regulator would generally prefer
rm h to invest.
4 Emission taxes
In this section we establish the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria for emission taxation under
commitment (subsection 4.2) and time consistency (subsection 4.3), and compare the two
policy regimes to each other (subsection 4.4). But rst, in subsection 4.1, we discuss some
elements of the game that are common between commitment and time consistency: the
rms choice of abatement in stage three, and the regulators preferred tax rate for a given
technology.
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4.1 Preliminaries
In the third and nal stage of the game, facing emission tax rate t, the rm with technology
 ( = 1; h; l) minimizes the sum of abatement cost and tax payment C(a) + t(e   a).
The rst order condition, dening the cost-minimizing abatement level a(t); is:13
C 0[a(t)] = t (22)
Total di¤erentiation with respect to t yields:
da(t)
dt
=
1
C 00[a(t)]
> 0 (23)
The inequality follows from C 00 > 0: Thus abatement is increasing in the tax rate.
Totally di¤erentiating (22) with respect to  yields:
da(t)
d
=
 C 0[a(t)]
C 00[a(t)]
< 0 (24)
The inequality follows from C 0; C 00 > 0: As l < h < 1; this implies a1(t) < ah(t) < al(t).
Let us now determine the welfare-maximizing tax rate for a given technology. If
the regulator knew that the rm was using technology ; she would set the tax rate to
minimize variable social cost, where (variable) social cost (V )SC(t) is given by (1):
SC(t) = F + V SC(t); V SC(t) = C[a(t)] +D[e  a(t)] (25)
with a(t) given by (22). Di¤erentiating with respect to t and using (22) implicitly denes
the welfare-maximizing tax rate for a rm with technology :
t = D
0[e  a(t)] (26)
Totally di¤erentiating (26) with respect to  and noting that a(t) = a given by (2):
dt
d
=  D00[e  a(t)]
da
d
> 0 (27)
The inequality follows from D00 > 0 and (3). Thus t1 > th > tl:
13We assume that there is always an interior solution for a(t): Goodkind and Coggins (2015) show
that when corner solutions can occur (either complete abatement or no abatement at all), taxes have an
advantage over quantity controls.
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If rm l invests and rm h has technology  ;  = 1; h, the tax rate minimizes:
E [V SC l(t)] = pV SC (t) + (1  p)V SCl(t) (28)
with V SC(t);  = 1; h; l; given by (25). The rst order condition is, using (1) and (22):
p ft l  D0[e  a (t l)]g da 
dt
+ (1  p) ft l  D0[e  al(t l)]g dal
dt
= 0 (29)
We nd that:
Lemma 5 tl < thl < th; with tl and th given by (26), and thl by (29):
4.2 Commitment
With commitment, the regulator sets the tax rate t in stage one and the rm chooses its
technology  in stage two. In stage three, which we have already analyzed in subsection
4.1, the rm sets the abatement level a(t) given by (22).
For stage two, dene t^(F ) and F(t) as the tax rate and the xed cost level, respec-
tively, that make rm  indi¤erent between the current and the new technology:14
C[a1(t^[F ])]  t^[F ]a1(t^[F ]) = C[a(t^[F ])]  t^[F ]a(t^[F ]) + F (30)
F(t)  C[a1(t)]  C[a(t)] + t [a(t)  a1(t)] (31)
with a(t) given by (22).
Firm  will adopt the new technology if and only if t > t^(F ) or equivalently F < F(t).
Totally di¤erentiating (31) with respect to  yields, using (22):
dF(t)
d
=  C[a(t)] < 0 (32)
Thus, since F(t) = 0 in (31) for  ! 1; and l < h < 1; we have Fl(t) > Fh(t) > 0:
Totally di¤erentiating (31) with respect to t yields, using (22) and (24):
dF(t)
dt
= a(t)  a1(t) > 0 (33)
The inequality follows from (24).
Moving on to stage one, we can now state the equilibria for the whole game:15
14In the following, we will often write t^(F ) simply as t^:
15In Appendix B we present the additional assumptions that guarantee that the second and third
equilibria coexist.
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Proposition 4 Let the regulator set the tax rate in stage one and the rm make its
investment decision in stage two. Let F h in (5) exceed Fl in:
V SCl[t^l( Fl)] + Fl = SC1[t^l( Fl)] (34)
with t^l( Fl) given by (30). Then the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria are:
1. When 0 < F < Fh(thl); with Fh(thl) given by (31), the regulator sets thl given by
(29) and the rm invests, irrespective of its type.
2. When Fh(thl) < F < Fh; with Fh given by
pSC1(t1l) + (1  p)

V SCl(t1l) + Fh

= pV SCh(t^h) + (1  p)V SCl(t^h) + Fh (35)
[with (V )SC(t) given by (25) and t^h by (30)], the regulator sets t^h(F ) + " and the
rm invests, irrespective of its type.
3. When Fh < F < Fl(t1l); with Fl(t1l) given by (31), the regulator sets t1l given by
(29) and only the rm of type l invests.
4. When Fl(t1l) < F < Fl; with Fl given by (34), the regulator sets t^l(F )+"; with t^l(F )
given by (30) and only the rm of type l invests.
5. When Fl < F < F h ; the regulator sets t^l(F )  "; and the rm does not invest.
Intuitively, when F is very low, both types of rm will invest, and the regulator can
set the optimal tax rate thl given that both types invest (Proposition 4.1). When F gets
higher, rm h no longer wants to invest at thl: Since the regulator still wants rm h to
invest, she sets the tax rate t^h + " that just induces investment by rm h (Proposition
4.2). For higher F; it is no longer optimal to induce rm h to invest. The regulator will
then set the tax rate t1l which is optimal given that only rm l invests (Proposition 4.3).
For even higher F; mirroring Proposition 4.2, rm l no longer wants to invest at t1l. Since
the regulator still wants rm l to invest, she sets the tax rate t^l + " that just induces
investment by rm l (Proposition 4.4). Finally, for very high F; the regulator does not
want rm l to invest. She therefore sets the tax rate t^l   " that just discourages rm l
from investing (Proposition 4.5).
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Figure 3: Emission taxation
4.3 Time consistency
With time consistency, the rm chooses its technology  in stage one and the regulator sets
the tax rate t in stage two. In stage three, which we have already analyzed in subsection
4.1, the rm sets its abatement level a(t) according to (22):
Let us start the analysis in stage two. As under quotas, let us label the ex post
probability that the rm is of type h as q: If the rm has not invested, the regulator sets
the tax rate at t1 given by (26). If the rm has invested and the regulator believes both
types would have invested, then q = p and she sets the tax rate at thl given by (29). If the
rm has invested and the regulator believes only rm l would have invested, then q = 0;
and she sets the tax rate at tl given by (26). We will assume that if the regulator believes
neither type would have invested, she will set the tax rate at tl in the out-of-equilibrium
event of investment.
In stage one, if rm  expects a tax rate of thl upon investment; it will invest if:
F < F hl  C(a1)  t1a1   C[a(thl)] + thla(thl) (36)
Di¤erentiating with respect to  yields dF hl =d =  C[a(thl)] < 0. Thus F hll > F hlh : In
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Figure 3, F hll is given by area OBt1thlU and F
hl
h by OBt1thlZ: Both exceed the maximum
F of F h = OBH:
Lemma 6 F hlh > F

h ; with F
hl
h given by (36) and F

h by (5).
Thus both types of rm would invest when they expect a tax rate of thl after invest-
ment. If the rm expects tl after investment, again both types of rm will invest. This is
because obtaining a tax rate of tl < thl (by Lemma 5) is even more attractive than a tax
rate of thl: There is then only one Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:
Proposition 5 Let the rm make its investment decision in stage one and the regulator
set the tax rate in stage two. In the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the rm invests,
irrespective of its type, and the regulator sets the tax rate at thl given by (29).
4.4 Comparing commitment and time consistency
Comparing the taxation equilibria under commitment (Proposition 4) and time consis-
tency (Proposition 5), we nd:
Proposition 6 Comparing the commitment and time consistency equilibria under emis-
sion taxation:
1. Time consistency always results in both types of rm investing. With commitment,
this only happens for F < Fh given by (35):
2. When F < Fh(thl) given by (29) and (31), commitment and time consistency result
in the same outcome. When F > Fh(thl); expected social cost is lower in the time
consistency equilibrium, except possibly for F 2  F c; Fc where Fh < F c < Fl(t1l) <
Fc < Fl; with Fh given by (35), Fl(t1l) by (31) and (29), and Fl by (34).
Time consistency always leads to investment by both types of rm, while commitment
does not. Under time consistency, the rm is rewarded for investment by a lower tax rate.
With commitment, the tax rate necessarily has to remain the same, whether the rm
invests or not. Since we have assumed (by setting F < F h ) that investment in the new
technology is socially desirable, the higher investment incentive of time-consistent policy
means that it usually results in higher welfare.
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5 Comparing the instruments
In this section we shall compare emission taxation and emission quotas given that the
policy scenario is either commitment or time consistency. In subsection 5.1, we compare
the investment incentives that the instruments provide. In subsection 5.2, we compare
the instruments on welfare, given that the abatement cost and environmental damage
functions are quadratic.
5.1 Investment incentives
It follows from Propositions 1, 2, 4 and 5 that the comparison of the investment incentives
from emission quotas and emission taxation depends crucially on the order of moves:
Corollary 1.
1. With commitment, quotas always lead to investment, while taxation does not;
2. With time consistency, taxation always leads to investment, while quotas do not.
The second part of the corollary is the most straightforward to explain: taxation re-
wards investment, while quotas punish it. The regulator responds to the rms investment
by setting a lower tax rate, but a tighter quota.
Corollary 1.1 can be explained with the aid of Figure 4. Let us rst consider the
rms investment incentives when the regulator knows the rm is of type h. We shall
focus on the equilibrium where the regulator sets the optimal policy, correctly expecting
rm h to invest. With quotas, she will then set ah given by (2): The rms abatement
cost without investment is ORah whereas with investment it is OHa

h + F: The rm will
invest if F < Fh(ah) as dened in (7), which is ORH in Figure 4: With taxation, the
regulator sets th given by (26): The rms total cost (abatement cost plus tax payment)
without investment is OXthe; whereas with investment it is OHthe + F: The rm will
invest if F < Fh(th) in (31) which is OXH in Figure 4: We see that the incentive to
invest under taxes is smaller than under targets, because OXH < ORH in Figure 4.
Formally, note rst that by (23), ah = ah(th) > a1(th): It then follows from (7) and (31)
24
OMAC1
MED
MACh
MACl
B
H
a
th
thl
t1
G
W
J
K
X
R
N
S
a1 ah e* * *am
.
.
.
.....
.
.
Figure 4: Investment incentives with commitment: targets and taxation compared
that Fh(th) < Fh(ah) if and only if:
th [ah(th)  a1(th)] < C[ah(th)]  C[a1(th)]
This inequality holds because C 0[a1(th)] = th (by (22)) and C 00 > 0:
This nding runs counter to the well-known textbook argument that taxes provide
a larger investment incentive than quotas.16 The argument there is that with quotas,
investment only allows for the existing quota to be met at lower cost, while taxation gives
the rm the option to abate more and to save on the tax bill. The textbook argument
assumes that the instruments are set such that they result in the same abatement level
pre-investment. For ease of comparison, we shall take the target to be a1 given by (2) and
the tax rate as t1 given by (26).17 Then the rm would invest under targets if F < Fh(a1)
dened by (7), which is OBG in Figure 4: The rm would invest under taxes if F < Fh(t1)
given by (31), which is OBN in Figure 4. We see that OBN > OBG or by (7) and (31):
Fh(t1)  Fh(a1) = t1 [ah(t1)  a1]  h (C[ah(t1)]  C (a1)) > 0
16E.g. Hanley et al. (2007, Figure 5.7, p. 162). The rst graphical exposition appears to be Downing
and White (1986, Figure 2, p. 20).
17The argument is the same for any tax rate t and abatement target a1(t) given by (22):
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The inequality follows from hC 0[ah(t1)] = t1 by (22), and C 00 > 0: Thus for a given
pre-investment level of abatement, the investment incentive is higher with taxes.
Comparing the instruments for a given pre-investment level of abatement may make
sense if it is assumed that the regulator is myopic, it takes time to change policy or the
rm is small. However, we are looking at the case of a welfare-maximizing regulator that
can set the policy just before the rm makes its investment decision. Also, we are focusing
on the case of a large rm whose abatement decision has a signicant impact on social
welfare. In this case, if the regulator knows that the rm is going to invest, she should
set the instruments such that they result in optimal abatement post-investment.
Now let us consider the e¤ect of asymmetric information, in which case there is a
possibility that the rm is not of type h; but of type l instead. Again we look at the
case where the regulator sets the optimal policy, expecting the rm to invest even if it
has high costs.18 With quotas, the regulator sets am given by (10): Firm h will invest
for F < Fh(am) given by (7), which is OWJ in Figure 4: From (7), Fh(a

m) > Fh(a

1)
or OWJ > ORH because am > a

1 by (4) and (11), and C
0 > 0: Thus, asymmetric
information increases rm hs investment incentive under quotas. With taxation, the
regulator sets thl given by (29), with thl < th by Lemma 5, and the rm will invest
for F < Fh(thl) given by (31), which is OKS in Figure 4: From (33) and Lemma 5,
Fh(thl) < Fh(th) or OKS < OXH: Thus asymmetric information decreases rm hs
investment incentive under taxes.
We have found that under perfect information, quotas give more incentive to invest
than taxes. Asymmetric information increases the investment incentive for quotas and
decreases it for taxes. Thus asymmetric information makes the investment incentive gap
even larger in favour of quotas.
5.2 Welfare
In this subsection, we compare welfare under quotas and emission taxation, given that the
policy scenario is either commitment or time consistency. To achieve readable insights,
18We know from Proposition 4 that with taxation there is another equilibrium where both types invest
for F > Fh(thl), with the regulator setting the tax rate t^h(F ) + " which just induces investment by rm
h: However we also know from Proposition 4 that this requires the regulator to distort the tax rate by so
much that she decides to give up on investment by rm h for F > Fh:
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we will assume that both abatement costs and environmental damages are quadratic.
First let us consider the case where both types of rm invest in the new technology
and the regulator sets environmental policy optimally, given that they invest. This can
occur under commitment as well as with time consistency.
Lemma 7 Let the rm of type ;  = h; l; have variable abatement costs C(a) where
C 0(a) is linear with its slope normalized to 1. Let marginal damage D0(e  a) be a linear
function with slope d: Consider the case where both types of rm invest in the new tech-
nology and the regulator sets environmental policy optimally, given that they invest. That
is, with emission quotas, the regulator sets the abatement target am given by (10) and with
emission taxes, she sets thl given by (29).
1. Expected social cost is higher under taxes than under quotas if and only if:
pl + (1  p)h < d (37)
2. This inequality always holds as F hl > 0 in (15).
Lemma 7.1 is similar to the well-known Weitzman (1974) rule. Translated to our
application, the rule says that under additive uncertainty (i.e. about the intercept of
the Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curve), quotas are preferred to taxes if the MAC
curve is atter than the Marginal Environmental Damage (MED) curve. We consider
multiplicative uncertainty, about the slope of the MAC curve. Like Weitzman (1974),
we still nd that the comparison depends on the relative slopes of the MAC and MED
curves. However, condition (37) features a "reverse" probability weighting: the slope
of rm ls MAC curve is weighted with the probability that the rm is of type h; and
vice versa. Weitzman (1974, fn. p. 486; 1978) and Malcomson (1978) have previously
analyzed multiplicative uncertainty, but without deriving reverse probability weighting.19
Our result for multiplicative uncertainty about MAC has previously been obtained
by DAmato and Dijkstra (2015) in a setting with a continuum of small rms. The main
di¤erence with DAmato and Dijkstra (2015) is that in their paper the individual rms
19See also e.g. Watson and Ridker (1984) and Hoel and Karp (2001) who rely mainly on simulations.
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MAC curves with the new technology exhibit additive uncertainty. Endogenizing the
share of adopting rms, this transforms to multiplicative uncertainty about the industrys
MAC curve. By contrast, in our setting we assume multiplicative uncertainty about the
rms MAC with the new technology. As a result, in DAmato and Dijkstra (2015), the
reverse probability rule is all that is needed for the welfare comparison between the price
and the quantity instrument under commitment. In the present paper, by contrast, the
reverse probability rule only applies when the rm invests under both instruments.
In order to understand the reverse probability weighting, let us suppose the regulator
is practically certain that the rm is of type h: She would then set the abatement target
at ah and the tax rate at th: If, against all expectations, the rm is of type l; then the
related welfare loss depends on the slope of the MAC curve in the unlikely scenario that
the rm is of type l.
Lemma 7.2 shows that quotas are better than taxes when both types invest, since (37)
always holds as F hl > 0: F
h
l is rm hs gain from investing under time consistency when
the regulator sets the quota at al after investment. In Figure 1, F
h
l is given by the area
OBG   a1GY al : Note that the atter the MACh curve, the larger the area OBG and
the smaller a1GY a

l : In Figure 1, OBG is larger than a

1GY a

l ; which requires MACh to
be quite at. Indeed, it has to be atter than the MED curve. If MED is steeper than
MACh; it is also steeper than any weighted average of MACh and MACl.
We now turn to comparing the instruments under commitment more generally. For
quotas, the equilibrium described in Lemma 7 is the unique equilibrium (Proposition 1).
For taxation, there are many equilibria (Proposition 4), but the equilibrium described in
Lemma 7 generally has the lowest expected social cost of them all (Propositions 4 and
6.2). Using Lemma 7 we can then state:
Proposition 7 Let marginal abatement cost C 0(a) and marginal damage D0(e   a) be
linear functions. Let the regulator set either the emission quota target or the emission tax
rate in stage one and let the rm make its investment decision in stage two. Then, given
that F < F hl in (15), expected social cost is lower with quotas than with taxes, except
possibly except possibly for F 2  F t; Ft where Fh < F t < Fl(t1l) < Ft < Fl; with Fh given
by (35), Fl(t1l) by (31) and (29), and Fl by (34).
28
The generally better performance of quotas is due to two factors. First, quotas o¤er
higher investment incentives (Corollary 1.1), and investment is socially desirable. Sec-
ondly, where quotas and emission taxation both result in investment, quotas have lower
expected social costs (Lemma 7).
The welfare comparison of quotas and emission taxation under time consistency is
ambiguous, even if we assume quadratic abatement cost and environmental damage func-
tions. On the one hand, taxation has the advantage of always resulting in investment by
both types of rm (Corollary 1.2). On the other hand, however, taxation results in higher
expected social costs when both instruments result in investment (Lemma 7). Even when
both types of rm invest under taxation and they do not under quotas, taxation may still
result in higher expected social costs.
6 Conclusion
The incentives provided for the adoption of cleaner technologies are a signicant dimen-
sion when dealing with the design of environmental policy. The regulatory framework can
be particularly complicated when the technology in question is relatively new, so that the
regulator herself might not possess all the relevant information. We model such a situa-
tion by assuming that when the rm invests, the environmental authority cannot observe
whether the regulated rm is e¢ cient or ine¢ cient in using the adopted technology. We
address the performance of environmental quotas and emission taxes under two institu-
tional settings, commitment and time consistency. With commitment (time consistency),
the regulator sets environmental policy before (after) the rm has made its investment
decision.
Like the present paper, DAmato and Dijkstra (2015) [henceforth AD15] compare
emission taxation and quantity regulation (emission quotas in the present paper, tradable
emission permits in AD15) under commitment and time consistency when rms can choose
between the current and a new abatement technology and abatement costs with the new
technology are either high or low. When comparing our results to AD15, we should bear
in mind the di¤erences in setup between the two papers. In AD15 there is a continuum of
small rms, and the rst best is for some, but not all, rms to invest in the new technology.
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The present paper features only one rm, and the rst best is for this rm to invest, even
if it has high costs.
It is also worth noting that previous papers have already found di¤erences between
the single-rm and the many-rm case under full information. With many heterogeneous
rms, both taxation and tradeable permits implement the rst best under commitment
and time consistency (Requate and Unold, 2001). With a single rm, the only scenario
where the rst best is always implemented is with an emission quota under commitment
(Amacher and Malik, 2001).
When there is asymmetric information in the single-rm (the present paper) or the
multi-rm (AD15) case, the rst best cannot be implemented under commitment, because
the regulator cannot nd out whether costs are high or low. The welfare comparison
between the two instruments is guided by the reverse probability-weighted Weitzman rule
in both cases (although in the present paper this only applies if the rm invests under
both instruments).
The big di¤erence between the papers occurs under time consistency, where both
instruments implement the rst best in AD15, but neither instrument achieves this in the
present paper. In AD15, the regulator can infer the cost realization from the number of
rms that invest in the new technology, and each rm takes the regulators beliefs and
policy as given when it makes its investment decision. As a result, asymmetric information
is no obstacle to reaching the rst best. The present paper shows that with asymmetric
information the regulator cannot implement the rst best in the single-rm case even
when it was possible to do so with complete information. This is because the regulator
can only see the investment decision by the single rm. If both types of rm invest, as
they should in the rst best, the regulator cannot infer the rms type from its investment
decision. Firms can signal their type through their investment decision. However, this
signal is of a much lower quality with a single than with many rms.
Our paper sheds new light on the complexity of environmental policy design under
asymmetric information about the e¤ectiveness of a new abatement technology. There is
no one-size-ts-all solution: the choice of the best instrument depends on the ability of
the regulator to commit. Although the regulator can never reach the rst best, we can
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still compare investment incentives and welfare under the two instruments, with some
surprising results.
Our results are obtained in a very simple setting where, in particular, asymmetric
information is modeled assuming only two possible e¢ ciency levels in the use of the newly
adopted technology, and only one rm is subject to regulation, yet marginal damage is
increasing. This implies that some issues, mainly linked to rm heterogeneity and to the
possibility of asymmetric choices, cannot be analysed and are left for future research. Yet
we can show that the ordering of commitment and time consistency is crucially a¤ected by
the chosen environmental policy instrument and vice versa. Our analysis is policy relevant,
as we assess how informational asymmetries related to a newly crafted technology a¤ect
the adoption patterns when the regulator can gain information on the regulated rms
costs by being time (in)consistent.
In order to limit the number of cases to be analyzed, we have assumed that investment
is always socially desirable. We have also abstracted from the positive spillovers that the
rms investment could have in the form of knowledge and adoption externalities (Ja¤e
et al. (2003), pp. 471-474; Ja¤e et al. (2005)). These positive externalities would
change the regulators behaviour under commitment. The regulator might want to set a
stricter target or a higher tax rate in order to nudge the rm towards investment, thereby
generating positive spillovers. The regulators behaviour under time consistency would
remain the same, because here she sets policy after the rm has made its investment
decision. Taking these positive externalities into account, the rms investment might
well have the potential to improve overall social welfare, even if it has a negative e¤ect
on the sum of its own abatement costs and pollution damage. However, modeling this
explicitly would lead to a further proliferation of cases to be analyzed. We leave this for
future research.
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A Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma 1. Recall that a;  = l; h; 1; is dened by (2). For any a  al (with the new
or the current technology), normalize the rms payment T to the regulator to zero. For
any a with ah  a < al (again regardless of the technology choice), the rm pays T  with
l [C(al )  C(ah)] < T  < h [C(al )  C(ah)]
For any a with 0  a < ah and investment in the new technology, the rm pays T^ with
T^ > T  + hC(ah): For any a with 0  a < ah without investment in the new technology,
the rm pays T with T > T  + hC(ah) + F: The rm will then invest, regardless of its
type, and rm  will abate a:
Lemma 2. The lemma holds if and only if F < Fh(am) as given by (7) and (10). We
nd from (5) and (7):
Fh(a

m) = (1  h)C(am) > (1  h)C(ah) = C(ah) +D(e  ah)  [hC(ah) +D(e  ah)] >
> C(a1) +D(e  a1)  [hC(ah) +D(e  ah)] = F h
The rst inequality follows from (11) and C 0 > 0: The second inequality follows from
the fact that a1 minimizes SC1: Since we have assumed that F < F

h ; we also have
F < Fh(a

m); and both types of rm will invest when the abatement target is a

m:
Lemma 3. We see from (8) and (12) that E[SCm(am)]  E[SC1l(a1l)] is increasing in
F: Thus if E[SCm(am)]   E[SC1l(a1l)] < 0 for F = F h ; then the inequality holds for all
F < F h : Let us now determine the sign of E[SCm(a

m)]  E[SC1l(a1l)] for F = F h .
First, dene a1m > a1 implicitly by SC1(a1m) = SCh(a

m); or using (5) for F = F

h :
SC1(a1m)  SC1(a1) = SCh(am)  SCh(ah) (A1)
We shall now see that a1m < am: Suppose that a1m  am: Then we can write the LHS
of (A1) as:
SC1(a1m) SC1(a1) = [SC1(a1m)  SC1(am)]+[SC1(am)  SC1(ah)]+[SC1(ah)  SC1(a1)]
(A2)
The rst term between square brackets on the RHS is nonnegative, because a1m 
am > a

1 (the second inequality follows from (3) and m < 1) and SC
0
1(a) > 0 for a > a

1:
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The third term between square brackets on the RHS of (A2) is positive, because a1
minimizes SC1(a): Thus we have:
SC1(a1m)  SC1(a1) > SC1(am)  SC1(ah) (A3)
Comparing the RHS of (A3) to the RHS of (A1) yields:
SC1(a

m)  SC1(ah)  [SCh(am)  SCh(ah)] = (1  h) [C(am)  C(ah)] > 0 (A4)
The inequality follows from h < 1; (11) and C 0 > 0: It follows from (A3) and (A4)
that a1m  am cannot hold. Thus a1m < am:
We can now write:
[pSCh(a

m) + (1  p)SCl(am)]  [pSCh(ah) + (1  p)SCl(al )] =
pSC1(a1m) + (1  p)SCl(am)  [pSC1(a1) + (1  p)SCl(al )] <
< [pSC1(a1l) + (1  p)SCl(a1l)]  [pSC1(a1) + (1  p)SCl(al )] (A5)
The equality follows from (A1) and F = F h in (5). The inequality follows from
a1m < a

m; which implies a1m < a1l < a

m: Then SC1(a1m) < SC1(a1l) since a

1 < a1m < a1l
and SC 01(a) > 0 for a > a

1; and SCl(a

m) < SC1(a1l) since a

l > a

m > a1l and SC
0
l(a) < 0
for a < al :
Since the second term in square brackets in the rst line of (A5) cancels out against
the corresponding term in the last line by (5) with F = F h , the Lemma follows.
Lemma 4. F hm in (14) is decreasing in a

m (since C
0 > 0) and thus by (3) increasing in
m: Since by (9) the highest value of m is h for p! 1; the highest possible value of F hm is:
F hh  C(a1)  hC(ah) (A6)
We thus need to prove that F hh < F
l
l which implies from (15) and (A6):
hC(ah) > lC (a

l ) (A7)
Since F ll > 0 in (15) so that C(a

1) > lC(a

l ) > 0; and also l < 1, lC(a

l ) must be on
the increasing branch of C(a): l < e by Assumption 1. Then if h is between l and e;
it is also on the increasing branch and (A7) holds. If h is between e and 1; it is on the
decreasing branch of eC(a); so that hC(ah) > C(a1) > lC(al ) and (A7) also holds.
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Lemma 5. Suppose thl  tl; then by (23) we would have al(thl)  al(tl) and ah(thl) <
ah(th); so that by D00 > 0 and (26); D0 [e  al(thl)]  thl and D0 [e  ah(thl)] > thl: Thus
the rst term in curly brackets on the LHS of (29) is negative and the second term is
nonpositive. This, combined with (23) means that the LHS of (29) is positive, so that
(29) cannot hold. In the same way, we can show that thl < th:
Proposition 4. In the rst equilibrium, for very low values of F , in stage one the
regulator sets the optimal tax rate of thl (dened by (29)), given that both types of rm
will invest, and in stage two both types of rm invest. At thl; rm h will invest for all
F < Fh(thl) given by (31): As we have seen following (32), Fh(thl) > 0:
In the second equilibrium, while rm h would no longer invest at thl; the regulator
would still like to induce it to invest. Thus the regulator sets the tax rate at t^h(F ) + ";
with t^h(F ) given by (30).
As F keeps rising, there comes a point at which the regulator prefers to see only rm l
investing. In the third equilibrium the regulator sets the optimal tax rate of t1l (dened
by (29), given that rm l will invest, but rm h will not. At F = Fh in (35), the regulator
is indi¤erent between the second and the third equilibrium:
When F grows larger, it will reach Fl(t1l); dened by (31) as the point beyond which
rm l no longer wants to invest at tax rate t1l: However, in the fourth equilibrium, the
regulator still induces rm l to invest by setting the tax rate at t^l(F )+"; with t^l(F ) given
by (30).
For even higher F; the regulator no longer wishes rm l to invest. When neither type of
rm invests, the regulator would ideally like to set the tax rate at t1: However, if in stage
one the regulator sets t1, rm h will invest in stage two. Figure 3 illustrates this: Firm h
invests at t1 for F < Fh(t1) = OBN; which exceeds the maximum F of F h = OBH.
Formally, comparing Fh(t1) to F h in (5), we nd:
Fh(t1)  F h = ft1(ah   a1)  [D(e  a1) D(e  ah)]g+
+ ft1[ah(t1)  ah]  h [C[ah(t1)]  C(ah)]g > 0
The rst term in curly brackets on the RHS is positive by (4), t1 = D0(e   a1) by
(26) and D00 > 0: This term is given by area BVH in Figure 3. The second term in
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curly brackets is positive because ah(t1) > ah(th) = ah as t1 > th by (27) and by (23),
hC 0[ah(t1)] = t1 by (22) and C 00 > 0: This term is given by area V NH in Figure 3.
Since setting the tax rate at t1 would not have the desired result, thefth equilibrium
features the regulator setting the tax rate as high as possible, while still discouraging rm
l from investing. This means the tax rate will be t^l(F )   "; with t^l(F ) given by (30).
We have dened Fl in (34) as the level of xed cost at which the regulator is indi¤erent
between inducing rm l to invest and discouraging investment. We have assumed Fl <
F h ; in order for all ve equilibria to occur for F 2 (0; F h ):
Lemma 6. From (5) and (36) we nd:
F hlh   F h = f(t1   thl)(e  ah)g+ f(t1   th)(ah   a1)  [D(e  a1) D(e  ah)]g+
+ f(th   thl) [ah   ah(thl)]  h (C(ah)  C[ah(thl)])g > 0
The rst term in curly brackets is positive because t1 > th > thl by (27) and Lemma
5: This is area V t1thlX in Figure 3. The second term is positive by (4), th = D0(e   ah)
in (26), D00 > 0 and t1 > th by (27): This is area BVH in Figure 3. The third term is
positive because th > thl by Lemma 5; ah = ah(th) > ah(thl) by (23), (26) and C
00 > 0:
This is area ZHX in Figure 3.
Proposition 6. The rst commitment equilibrium listed in Proposition 4 is the same
as the only equilibrium under time consistency (Proposition 5) and thus yields the same
expected social costs. The second equilibrium under commitment yields higher expected
social costs than this, because while both equilibria have both types of rm investing, thl
is the optimal tax rate given that they do. At F = Fh under commitment; the regulator
is indi¤erent between the tax rates of t^h + " (the second equilibrium) and t1l (the third
equilibrium). Thus by continuity, the third equilibrium under commitment also yields
higher expected social costs than the time consistency equilibrium for F close to the
lower bound of Fh. For F close to the higher bound of Fl(t1l) however, social costs could
be lower under commitment.20 Since t^l[Fl(t1l)] = t1l; social cost could also be lower in the
fourth commitment equilibrium for F close to the lower bound of Fl(t1l): However, at the
higher bound of F = Fl; social cost is higher in commitment. This is because in the fth
20In Appendix B, we use a quadratic specication to show that it is indeed possible for social costs to
be lower under commitment for F = Fl(t1l).
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commitment equilibrium, social cost is higher under commitment:
SC1(t^l + ") > SC1(t1) = SC1(a

1) > SCh(a

h) = SCh(th) > E [SChl(thl)]
The rst inequality follows from the fact that t1 minimizes social cost, given that
the rm does not invest. The second inequality follows from F < F h in (5). The third
inequality follows from the fact that E [SChl(thl)] is decreasing in l with l < h:
Lemma 7. Part 1. A linear marginal abatement cost curve C 0(a) with slope 1 implies
C(a) = 1
2
a2; C 0(a) = a: A linear marginal environmental damage curve D0(e   a) with
slope d implies D(e   a) = d
2
(e   a)2; D0(e   a) = d(e   a): From (10), the quota am is
given by:
am =
de
d+ ph+ (1  p)l (A8)
The corresponding expected social costs are:
E [SCm(a

m)] = F +
1
2
de2 [ph+ (1  p)l]
d+ ph+ (1  p)l (A9)
From (22), the rm with technology  responds to a tax rate of t by setting:
a(t) =
t

(A10)
From (29), the rst order condition for social cost minimization with respect to t
implies:
thl =
dehl [(1  p)h+ pl]
(1  p)h2 (d+ l) + pl2 (d+ h) (A11)
The corresponding (minimum) expected social costs at thl are:
E [SChl(thl)] = F +
1
2
de2
dp(1  p) (h  l)2 + hl [(1  p)h+ pl]
d [(1  p)h2 + pl2] + hl [(1  p)h+ pl] (A12)
The di¤erential gain in favour of quotas is, from (A9) and (A12):
E [SChl(thl)]  E [SCm(am)] =
1
2
d2e2 (h  l)2 p(1  p) [d  (1  p)h  pl]
[d+ ph+ (1  p)l] [(1  p)h2 (d+ l) + pl2 (d+ h)]
which is positive if and only if (37) holds.
Part 2. (2) and (15) imply, in our quadratic setting:
F hl =
1
2

de
d+ 1
2
  h
2

de
d+ l
2
> 0
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As F hl is increasing in l < h; a necessary condition for the inequality to hold is:
(d+h)2 > h(d+1)2; that can be rewritten as d2(1 h) > h(1 h); or d2 > h; since h < 1:
If d > 1; then d > h; so that (37) always holds. If d < 1; then d > d2 > h and again (37)
always holds.
B Appendix B: Additional assumptions for Proposi-
tion 4
In order to make sure that the second equilibrium in Proposition 4 exists, we must
examine the regulators and the rms incentives at F = Fh(thl): If t1l > thl; rm h would
invest at a tax rate of t1l; so that even if the regulator would prefer t1l and no investment
by rm h; this outcome is not feasible. If t1l < thl; rm h would not invest at t1l and
the regulator might prefer to set t1l: In that case, there would not be an equilibrium with
t^h + ": To ensure existence of this equilibrium, we must thus assume:
Assumption 2. If t1l < thl; with t1l and thl given by (29), then E [SChl(thl)] < E [SC1l(t1l)]
at F = Fh(thl); with E [SChl(t)] and E [SC1l(t)] given by (28), and Fh(t) by (31).
From (28), E [SChl(thl)]  E [SC1l(t1l)] is increasing in F: Thus Assumption 2 means
that E [SChl(thl)] < E [SC1l(t1l)] for all F  Fh(thl):
As for the third equilibrium, the switch from t^h to t1l at Fh can only occur when
rm h will not invest, but rm l will. We shall assume that this is the case:
Assumption 3. t^l( Fh) < t1l < t^h( Fh); with t(F ) given by (30), Fh by (35), and t1l by
(29).
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